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SECURITY COOPERATION 
Security is a top priority in China's Central Asian 
strategy. During his meeting with Nazarbayev in 
summer 2011, President Jintao stressed the 
importance of security. He particularly outlined what 
he considers the three main 'evils' in Central Asia: 
separatism, extremism and terrorism.'" The list is not 
surprising, as it reflects Beijing's preoccupation with 
the destabilising activities in Xinjiang, a turbulent 
Chinese autonomous region, which has experienced 
sporadic outbursts of social violence. The Muslim 
and Turkic Uyghur, who constitute the majority of the 
population, claim that their region is a victim of 
Chinese d i sc r imina t ion , co lon ia l i sm and 
oppression." The July 2011 explosion of violence 
cast a shadow of pessimism over long-lasting 
stability in Xinjiang.*' Xinjiang is a strategic region 
for China, as all Central Asian oil and gas pipelines 
linking the eastern part of China to Central Asia run 
across that territory. The eruption of violence in this 
strategic territory could adversely impinge on 
Chinese oil imports and put at risk Beijing's energy 
security. 
It is no wonder then that the Chinese leadership is 
manifestly fearful of instability and religiously 
motivated terrorism, as evidenced by China's 
vigorous pleas to enhance the role of the SCO to 
ensure regional stability.'' In this respect, security is 
more and more a determining factor in the relations 
between China and Kazakhstan, and in the short term 
it will have an increasingly important part to play 
within the SCC* ' Some Kazakhstani observers, 
however, believe that Kazakhs t an -Ch ina 
cooperation is actually much more a showcase of 
Beijing's diplomatic skills than a bona fide desire to 
establish friendly relations, while respecting 
Kazakhstan's sovereignty. They argue that true 
cooperation within the SCO will be difficult to 
achieve because Russia is unlikely to let the Central 
Asian states, with which it has strong and historical 
ties, drift away towards China without resistance.^' 
For Beijing, the best way to promote security may 
actually be through deeper economic cooperation 
with Astana. China's policies towards the five 
republics of Central Asia seek quite unequivocally to 
integrate Xinjiang's economy with those of Central 
Asian states.^ The Chinese often emphasise that the 
westernmost Chinese region shares deep cultural 
roots with Kazakhstan and that a trade partnership 
can only benefit the two, and the regions beyond. 
Bangguo, for instance, called the Khorgos centre a 
powerful opportunity to improve trade between 
Kazakhstan and China's western regions and increase 
cooperation at the regional level."' Beijing is 
currently implementing an ambitious plan to improve 
economic conditions in Xinjiang, reduce instances of 
social unrest and alleviate the frustration of the local 
Uyghur population. Kazakhstan's further economic 
integration into the Chinese north-west region has the 
potential to strengthen security through economic 
prosperity for an unpredictable and strategically 
pivotal region. 
RISKY DIVERSIFICATION 
A lack of diversification and a dependence on oil 
and gas exports are the two main problems of the 
Kazakhstani economy. China's investments in the 
secondary and tertiary economic sectors may prove 
the correct means to overcome these obstacles and 
gear the Kazakhstani economy towards the 
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production of value-added manufactured goods. 
It could permit Kazakhstan to avoid what the 
economist Barry Eichengreen calls the 'middle-
income trap', which can occur in countries with a 
small population, like Kazakhstan, and abundant oil 
and gas. This situation usually leads to high incomes 
with not much effort in terms of industrial innovation 
and economic efficiency.*" Eichengreen found that 
when a country's per capita GDP rises to somewhere 
between $ 1,000 and $ 12,000 per person measured in 
2010 dollars, its economy suddenly stalls and annual 
growth falls by at least two percentage points a year. 
It gets stuck in the lowest end of the middle. 
Countries in that situation hit the wall because easy 
gains out of low-productivity sectors (oil and gas) 
and in higher-productivity sectors, as well as from 
technology transfers, have reached the exhaustion 
point. This is exactly where Kazakhstan is perched. A 
country with a limited number of comparative 
advantages wil l be caught in the middle income and 
the constant policymaking uncertainty resulting from 
hydrocarbon price fluctuation. 
Escaping the middle-income trap, as a country 
like South Korea has done, requires the creation of a 
functioning, competitive large-scale internal 
economy. Astana at least has a sense of the 
importance of this goal since the 2011 presidential 
election. Nazarbayev's election programme was 
known as 'Kazakhstan 2030', with the slogan 'Let's 
Bui ld the Future Together'.'' Whether the 
Kazakhstani elite can pull it off is a matter for debate. 
Developing closer trade relations with China 
entails risks for Kazakhstan. There is an ongoing 
debat? as to the ability of the Chinese economy to 
maintain during the next five to 10 years growth rates 
as high as those experienced during the first decade of 
the 21st century. For Kazakhstan, beneficial 
economic cooperation with China will ultimately 
depend on its neighbour's prosperity. For many years, 
economic analysts, in both China and the West, have 
been warning policymakers about the pitfalls of an 
overheating Chinese economy.** 
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, an economic analyst 
for The Telegraph, keeps repeating, often in a quite 
pessimistic way, that China may face the problems of 
household over-expenditure in the not-too-distant 
ftiture.'" Forbes analyst Shaun Rein, on his part, has 
for years been warning about a looming dot-com 
bubble in China,™ a dangerously increasing inflation 
rate, real estate problems and US-China trade 
tensions." The 2010 World Economic Forum and 
Bloomberg's analysts have also identified worrying 
signals of economic overheating.'" Even though the 
odds are low for a 'hard landing', this scenario cannot 
be ruled out completely." 
The Kazakhstani economy is expected to become 
more and more dependent on China's investments, 
manufactured goods and energy imports. It runs the 
risk of being exposed to a dependence on one all-
powerful partner, as well as this partner's economic 
fortunes or misfortunes. A l l in all, this would mean 
substituting a dependency on hydrocarbon exports 
for a dependency on a single trading partner. Oddly 
enough, this hazard may be averted because 
authoritarian regimes are notoriously wary of a too 
strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In 
effect, Astana is, to some extent, cautious about 
China's plans for the region, and consequently 
prefers to adopt a gradualist approach in 
Kazakhstan-China bilateral relations rather than to 
let Beijing move in on Kazakhstan's assets in one big 
swoop.'" 
Astana under Nazarbayev has put in a lot of effort 
to enhance the Kazakhstani economic presence in the 
West and the former Soviet republics. In fact, one of 
the main features of Kazakhstan's foreign policy is 
the so-called 'multi-vector' approach, which seeks to 
advance Kazakhstan's national interests by balancing • 
those of the West, Russia and China, and 'integration 
and openness to the entire world'.'' It follows that 
Kazakhstani embassies and delegations abroad are 
actively committed to attracting investment from all 
comers of the world. Such activism is remarkable in 
many respects, especially as it is achieving concrete 
results. However, when Kazakhstan's geographic 
location is factored in, any optimism about the 
country's long-term prospects for development and 
prosperity is somewhat dampened. Despite its size (it 
is the world's ninth largest country), Kazakhstan is 
landlocked and abuts two colossal economic 
partners, Russia and China. Other Central Asian 
states are in no way capable of offering comparably 
promising opportunities for economic cooperation. 
This largely explains why Astana has embarked on a 
journey to elevate Kazakhstan to the status of'great 
power' in the Eurasia region, while keeping windows 
open in the direction of the West. 
Chinese migration 
If Chinese investments and low-price goods are 
generally greatly welcomed by both Central Asian 
governments and their citizens, the same cannot be 
said about Chinese immigration, temporary or 
permanent. Complaints about incoming Chinese 
workers are being heard more and more throughout 
Central Asia. Sometimes Central Asians' criticism is 
even directed at Chinese immigrant workers who 
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build strategic infrastructures, which would never see 
the light of day without China's financial and logistic 
input. Such negative sentiments are particularly 
strong in Kazakhstan, whose low population size and 
density pale in comparison with those of prosperous 
China. An increasing number of Kazakhstanis are 
fearful of a Chinese demographic expansion in their 
country. Many also accuse Beijing of conspiring to 
colonise Central Asian countries.'*' Chinese attempts 
to lease a vast swath of Kazakhstani land in 2010 
were not well received by the local population, and 
this led to fierce and unusually large-scale protests." 
Kazakhstanis are afraid that what awaits them is a 
demographic situation resembling that of the 
Uyghurs in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which 
lies just across the border, where the majority status 
of Uyghurs in the total population has been 
progressively reduced as a result of a massive influx 
of ethnic Han, who are set to become the majority in 
the not-so-distant future.'* Astana cannot afford to 
ignore the possibility of such a scenario unfolding in 
Kazakhstan as well, as it could prove a powerful 
impediment to economic integration between the two 
countries. 
A double dilemma for Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstani political authorities may have to face 
a harrowing policy dilemma. They will have to either 
fully open up the country to China's economic 
projects and become more and more dependent on the 
economic performance of a neighbour that will soon 
have a GDP approximately 100 times larger than that 
of Kazakhstan, or put up legal and economic ramparts 
against Beijing's foreign policy manoeuvres and limit 
itself to pocketing only a fraction of the potential 
benefits that could be brought about by closer 
bilateral relations. The Kazakhstanis' growing 
feelings of hostility towards Chinese penetration 
undoubtedly make it harder for Astana to solve this 
dilemma. Niklas Swanstrom, director of the 
Stockholm-based Institute for Security and 
Development Policy, is one analyst who believes that 
China-Kazakhstan relations will not develop much 
further than their current level, precisely because 
Nazarbayev and his entourage seem uninterested in 
setting in motion closer cooperation.''* 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, China-Kazakhstan political and 
economic cooperation has achieved impressive 
successes. The two countries are developing ties 
primarily in the energy sphere, while China seems to 
be encouraging Kazakhstan's economic diversifica-
tion. However, to diversify the Kazakhstani 
economy, Chinese investment alone may not be 
sufficient. Astana has to demonstrate a strong 
political will to successfully alter the economic 
structure, even though this may deprive the 
'oligarchs' of their control over whole business . 
sectors. Kazakhstan's cooperation with China on 
security-related matters has economic dimensions, 
which may ultimately prove to be more crucial than 
pure mutual military assistance. In fact, Kazakhstan 
could become an indispensable ally in Beijing's 
efforts to quell social unrest in Xinjiang. The 
Kazakhstan-China economic integration will rub off 
on both countries to Xinjiang's benefit. In this regard, 
the promotion of trade in border areas is particularly 
important. 
There are drawbacks associated with further 
cooperation, however. Depending too much on China 
may be dangerous for Kazakhstan. A serious 
economic downturn experienced by China would 
spill over to Kazakhstan, much in the same way that 
an economic recession in the United States always 
has deep consequences for Canadian markets and 
exporters. Moreover, the two countries might be 
close to reaching the limits of their cooperation. The 
wariness of Kazakhstani officials over China's 
growing power and the local population's fear of the 
Chinese demographic expansion may prove to be 
insurmountable obstacles to future cooperation 
between the two countries. In any event, Kazakhs-
tan's national economic problems are unlikely to be 
solved in the near future. 
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